§ 1. Introduction
Let Xl> X 2' ... , X n be independent non-negative random variables on a proba bility space (Q, 2I, P), and let 1' " denote the set of stop rules for Xl' ... , X n' The "prophet" inequality E(max{X I , ... , Xn})~ksup{EXt: tE1',,} has been studied in the theory of semiamarts (e.g., [2-5J) . Krengel and Sucheston [3J discovered that 2~k~4 for all n and all Xl' ... ,X n , and Garling's proof ([3J, p.237) shows that k = 2, and that 2 is the best possible bound.
The purpose of this note is to offer a constructive proof that k = 2, using extremal random variables called "long shots", and to show that in fact strict inequality holds in all non-trivial situations. The main result is Theorem 1. Let n> 1, and Xl' X 2' "', X n be independent non-negative random variables with positive finite expectations. Then E(max {Xl' ... , X n }) < 2 sup {EXt: With this notation, the conclusion of Theorem 1 is that R(X I , ... ,X n )<2 for all n> 1 and all Xl' ... , X n • Essential in the construction to follow is the notion of a "long shot", a two valued random variable which is nearly always zero, but is very large on a set of small probability.
Definition.
A long shot is a random variable L defined by L=O with probability 1-p and =fl with probability p, where fl>10 6 and 0<p<10-6 . (Any "large" and "small" constants will do.) 
The first inequality in (1) follows since
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the equality in (1) Next, it will be shown that the last two random variables X n _ l and X" may be replaced by some long shot L. Let L p be a long shot independent of X 2 ,,,,,X n _ 2 with P(Lp=V (Xn_1,X,,) 
Thus for pi sufficiently small, the long shot L = L p ' satisfies
which, with (1), completes the proof of the lemma. 0 § 3. Remarks
An easy consequence of Theorem 1 IS the result of Garling for infinite se quences:
If the independence assumption is dropped, the proportionate advantage a prophet enjoys over a gambler in an n-step game is at most n. If one drops the non-negativity assumption, on the other hand, the prophet's proportionate advantage may be arbitrarily high in even a 2-step game of independent random variables.
Examplel. Fix M~O. Let X l =l, and define X 2 by P(X 2 =2M)=P(X 2 = -2M) = 1/2. Then V(X l , X 2) = 1, and E(X l v X 2) = M + 1/2.
